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  Land	  Redistribution	  and	  Poverty	  Effects:	  A	  Study	  of	  South	  Africa	  	  Abstract:	  South	  Africa’s	  land	  grant	  program	  was	  established	  in	  1996	  to	  racial	  inequality	  in	  land	  holdings.	  	  Valente	  (2009)	  found	  participation	  reduces	  food	  security	  levels,	  a	  finding	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  wider	  literature.	  	  Using	  OLS	  and	  propensity	  score	  matching	  models,	  I	  analyze	  the	  Labor	  Force	  Survey	  between	  2001-­‐2004,	  estimating	  the	  program’s	  effect	  on	  poverty.	  	  The	  data	  contains	  key	  variables	  such	  as	  participation	  in	  the	  redistribution	  program,	  household	  expenditure,	  and	  food	  security.	  	  The	  data	  also	  contains	  indicators	  of	  race,	  province,	  gender,	  age,	  education	  and	  farming	  reason.	  	  Results	  suggest	  program	  participants	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  non-­‐participants,	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research.	  	   	  	  Justin	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Land	  ownership	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  often	  marked	  by	  a	  skewed	  distribution	  between	  races	  and	  classes.	  	  	  Land	  reform	  is	  often	  an	  attractive	  policy	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  to	  address	  both	  equity	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  at	  once.	  	  Equity	  of	  land	  holdings	  is	  the	  ideal	  end	  result	  of	  any	  redistribution	  program	  by	  definition,	  and	  the	  resulting	  distribution	  of	  resources	  is	  expected	  to	  lead	  to	  improved	  livelihoods	  of	  recipients.	  	  If	  these	  reforms	  are	  targeted	  towards	  the	  poor	  –	  who	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  such	  a	  program	  –poverty	  reduction	  is	  the	  expected	  result.	  	  As	  such,	  many	  governments	  have	  pursued	  and	  implemented	  reform	  programs	  to	  promote	  these	  goals.	  	  However,	  whether	  these	  programs	  are	  effective	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  ensure	  an	  efficient	  use	  of	  resources.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  paper	  examines	  if	  participation	  in	  a	  land	  redistribution	  program	  improves	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  beneficiaries.	  	   Land	  ownership	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  marked	  by	  such	  distributional	  inequality.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1600’s,	  British	  and	  Dutch	  settlers	  began	  to	  arrive	  in	  the	  Cape	  of	  Good	  Hope	  –	  seizing	  ever-­‐increasing	  tracts	  of	  land.	  	  As	  the	  settlers	  moved	  inland,	  they	  began	  to	  force	  the	  native	  African	  population	  into	  smaller	  and	  smaller	  reserves.	  	  The	  1913	  Land	  Act	  solidified	  the	  trend,	  forcing	  the	  black	  population	  to	  live	  in	  Bantustans,	  or	  “Homelands,”	  which	  accounted	  for	  approximately	  10%	  of	  the	  countries	  available	  land	  (Lahiff,	  2007;	  Valente,	  2009).	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  the	  minority	  10%	  of	  the	  country	  owns	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  country’s	  land,	  resulting	  in	  a	  highly	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  income.	  	  “In	  2001	  the	  proportion	  of	  people	  living	  under	  the	  poverty	  line	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  57%”	  (Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  When	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  fell	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  the	  country	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transitioned	  into	  a	  full	  democracy	  in	  1994,	  the	  new	  leaders	  sought	  to	  address	  the	  large-­‐scale	  poverty	  and	  landlessness	  of	  the	  population	  (Hall,	  2010).	  	  South	  Africa	  did	  so	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  land	  reform	  program	  designed	  to	  promote	  racial	  equity	  in	  land	  and	  to	  additionally	  address	  poverty.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  questions	  of	  efficiency	  as	  well	  as	  effectiveness	  about	  the	  South	  Africa	  program,	  especially	  since	  the	  program	  is	  suspected	  of	  not	  benefiting	  participants	  and	  “relatively	  little	  high	  value	  land	  has	  been	  transferred	  to	  date”	  (Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  This	  motivates	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  participation	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  redistribution	  program	  is	  increasing	  household	  expenditure,	  or	  reducing	  the	  incidence	  of	  poverty	  and	  food	  insecurity	  among	  participants.	  	   Few	  empirical	  studies	  have	  been	  performed	  on	  the	  South	  African	  program.	  	  This	  is	  due	  perhaps	  to	  data	  limitations.	  	  There	  are	  few	  sources	  of	  data	  regarding	  the	  country’s	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  For	  this	  paper	  Statistics	  South	  Africa’s	  Labor	  Force	  Survey	  between	  2001	  and	  2004	  is	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  link	  between	  poverty,	  household	  expenditure,	  food	  insecurity,	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  This	  paper	  will	  use	  these	  indicators	  as	  measures	  of	  well-­‐being	  assuming	  that	  households	  that	  spend	  more	  and	  are	  less	  food	  insecure	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  live	  in	  poverty.	  	  
Background	   	  Post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa	  quickly	  put	  in	  place	  a	  land	  policy	  with	  three	  main	  goals:	  to	  restore	  land	  to	  those	  dispossessed	  after	  1913,	  to	  secure	  formal	  tenure	  rights	  for	  those	  already	  occupying	  land,	  and	  to	  redistribute	  thirty	  percent	  of	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agricultural	  land	  from	  white	  farmers	  to	  black	  citizens	  (Hall,	  2010;	  Lahiff,	  2007;	  Valente,	  2009).	  	  The	  program	  has	  revolved	  around	  limited	  state	  intervention	  and	  market	  forces	  by	  providing	  grants	  to	  participants	  to	  purchase	  land	  from	  existing	  owners.	  The	  1996	  Constitution	  protected	  the	  existing	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  white	  minority,	  limiting	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  pursue	  redistribution	  by	  expropriation.	  	  The	  program	  implemented	  rests	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  market	  oriented	  willing-­‐seller	  willing-­‐buyer.	  	  The	  government	  provides	  grants	  to	  those	  seeking	  to	  purchase	  land,	  but	  will	  not	  coerce	  current	  property	  owners	  to	  sell	  (Department	  of	  Land	  Affairs,	  1997;	  Hall,	  2010;	  Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  This	  possibly	  limits	  the	  amount	  and	  quality	  of	  land	  transferred	  to	  new	  owners,	  as	  existing	  owners	  will	  hold	  onto	  the	  best	  land.	   The	  Settlement	  Land	  Acquisition	  Grant	  provided	  up	  to	  R	  15,000	  ($2,148	  in	  2000	  dollars)	  to	  potential	  farmers	  to	  purchase	  land	  for	  agricultural	  cultivation.	  	  The	  program	  had	  a	  rocky	  start,	  redistributing	  only	  approximately	  one	  percent	  of	  land	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  (Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  Some	  issues	  encountered	  were	  expected,	  such	  as	  institutional	  learning	  as	  many	  bureaucrats	  were	  new	  to	  government.	  	  However,	  other	  issues	  were	  that	  grants	  were	  small	  and	  government	  regulation	  prohibited	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  large	  parcels	  of	  land.	  	  The	  result	  was	  that	  individuals	  had	  to	  pool	  their	  grants	  with	  a	  large	  group	  in	  order	  to	  afford	  most	  purchases	  (Hall,	  2010;	  Lahiff,	  2007;	  McCusker,	  2002).	  	  These	  sometimes	  unwieldy	  organizations	  required	  collective	  farming,	  possibly	  resulting	  in	  lower	  benefits	  for	  participants.	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  Recognizing	  these	  issues,	  in	  1999	  the	  program	  was	  reformed	  and	  renamed	  the	  Land	  Redistribution	  and	  Agricultural	  Development	  program.	  	  Changes	  were	  made	  to	  provide	  a	  larger	  grant	  (between	  R20	  000	  to	  R100	  000);	  to	  allow	  farming	  on	  any	  scale,	  and	  to	  remove	  the	  income	  cap	  thus	  opening	  the	  program	  to	  more	  affluent	  blacks	  (Hall,	  2010;	  Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  Significant	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  the	  program,	  however	  as	  implemented	  much	  remained	  the	  same	  (Hall,	  2010;	  Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  As	  such,	  benefits	  from	  the	  program	  are	  thought	  to	  remain	  limited.	  To	  date,	  South	  Africa	  has	  only	  redistributed	  approximately	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  commercial	  agriculture	  land	  held	  by	  white	  farmers	  in	  1994,	  far	  short	  of	  the	  goal	  of	  thirty	  percent	  (Valente,	  2009).	  	  The	  Labor	  Force	  Survey	  between	  2001	  and	  2004	  indicates	  that	  2.2%	  of	  the	  population	  is	  participating	  in	  the	  program.	  	  	  If	  benefits	  to	  participation	  exist,	  then	  more	  households	  are	  expected	  to	  participate.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  address	  whether	  there	  are	  benefits	  to	  participating	  in	  the	  land	  redistribution	  program.	  	  
Literature	  Review	  A	  popular	  remedy	  to	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  land	  across	  households	  has	  been	  to	  reform	  possession.	  	  The	  success	  of	  these	  programs	  should	  be	  measured	  not	  only	  by	  their	  absolute	  number	  of	  land	  parcels	  redistributed,	  but	  also	  by	  whether	  participation	  has	  improved	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  If	  programs	  do	  not	  benefit	  participants,	  then	  there	  may	  be	  more	  efficient	  uses	  of	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  and	  increase	  equity.	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The	  theory	  behind	  land	  redistribution	  is	  that	  the	  formerly	  landless	  (and	  most	  likely	  impoverished)	  will	  be	  able	  to	  create	  new	  wealth	  for	  themselves	  (Besley	  &	  Burgess,	  2000;	  Field,	  2007;	  Lahiff,	  2007;	  Valente,	  2009).	  	  The	  possession	  of	  a	  valuable	  asset	  allows	  the	  household	  increased	  economic	  options	  to	  improve	  their	  economic	  standing	  (Deininger,	  Hoogeveen,	  &	  Kinsey,	  2004).	  	  Land	  can	  be	  used	  to	  raise	  crops	  or	  graze	  livestock,	  or	  optimal	  use	  might	  be	  to	  sell	  or	  rent	  the	  land	  to	  others	  for	  income.	  This,	  theoretically,	  reduces	  the	  poor’s	  dependence	  on	  government	  welfare.	  	  	  A	  counter	  argument	  is	  that	  a	  more	  efficient	  program	  would	  simply	  provide	  grants	  to	  the	  poor	  to	  use	  without	  conditions.	  	  This	  would	  be	  similar	  to	  cash	  transfers	  made	  famous	  by	  Brazil.	  	  If	  participants	  were	  to	  purchase	  land,	  then	  that	  would	  be	  in	  their	  best	  interest.	  	  However,	  as	  governments	  are	  also	  promoting	  ideas	  such	  as	  racial	  equity	  of	  land	  possession,	  cash	  transfers	  are	  not	  as	  attractive	  as	  a	  policy	  choice.	  	  In	  addition,	  if	  the	  distribution	  of	  land	  in	  itself	  limits	  economic	  growth	  in	  other	  ways,	  then	  redistribution	  is	  also	  a	  better	  option.	  Land	  reform	  may	  take	  several	  forms	  including	  restitution,	  title/tenancy	  reform,	  or	  redistribution.	  	  	  Tenancy	  reforms	  are	  the	  most	  common	  means	  through	  which	  to	  redistribute	  land	  ownership.	  	  These	  often	  take	  the	  form	  of	  transferring	  titles	  from	  large,	  distant,	  or	  state	  owners	  to	  the	  households	  that	  actually	  work	  on	  the	  land.	  	  This	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “land	  to	  the	  tiller”	  reform	  (Lahiff,	  2007).	  Tenants	  with	  insecure	  property	  rights,	  such	  as	  urban	  squatters	  in	  Peru,	  or	  victims	  of	  weak	  legal	  systems	  in	  India,	  benefit	  by	  being	  able	  to	  collect	  more	  of	  the	  rents	  from	  their	  land/labor	  (Besley	  &	  Burgess,	  2000;	  Field,	  2007).	  	  By	  allowing	  them	  the	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security	  of	  knowing	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  evicted,	  less	  rents	  are	  paid	  to	  landlords	  and	  longer	  term	  planning	  can	  occur.	  	  In	  addition,	  home	  security	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  chief	  worry	  allowing	  beneficiaries	  to	  work	  outside	  the	  home,	  as	  after	  Peru’s	  titling	  program.	  	  This	  has	  lead	  to	  clear	  benefits	  to	  participants	  in	  the	  form	  of:	  more	  labor	  hours,	  less	  child	  labor,	  higher	  incomes,	  and	  less	  food	  insecurity.	  	   Similar	  results	  have	  been	  found	  in	  the	  Central	  Asian	  states	  of	  Tajikistan	  and	  Uzbekistan.	  	  Formerly	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  these	  countries	  have	  highly	  concentrated	  land	  ownership	  by	  the	  state.	  	  Unlike	  in	  India,	  where	  land	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  but	  independently	  farmed,	  production	  operations	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  countries	  were	  state	  directed	  (Z.	  Lerman	  and	  Sedik,	  2009;	  Z.	  Lerman,	  2008).	  	  	  Collective	  farms	  in	  these	  countries	  dominated	  the	  market,	  providing	  nominal	  employment	  to	  all,	  but	  producing	  relatively	  little.	  	  Household	  plots	  in	  Uzbekistan	  accounted	  for	  “only	  three	  percent	  of	  arable	  land	  [but]	  consistently	  accounted	  for	  20-­‐25	  percent	  of	  [the	  country’s]	  gross	  agricultural	  product”	  (Z.	  Lerman,	  2008)	  while	  in	  Tajikistan	  “agricultural	  land	  in	  [household]	  plots	  is	  utilized	  20-­‐50	  times	  more	  productively”	  than	  collective	  property	  (Z.	  Lerman	  &	  Sedik,	  2009).	  	  As	  such,	  reforms	  were	  aimed	  at	  allowing	  individuals	  to	  remove	  land	  from	  collectives	  for	  private	  operation.	  	  The	  market-­‐oriented	  reforms	  have	  benefited	  the	  program’s	  participants	  with	  larger	  incomes,	  and	  greater	  crop	  yields.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  lead	  to	  less	  food	  insecurity	  and	  an	  improved	  standard	  of	  living.	  Tenure	  reforms	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  an	  unsure	  legal	  status	  or	  improve	  production	  using	  more	  local	  control	  and	  market	  influences.	  	  These	  costs	  manifest	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  In	  Peru,	  they	  were	  the	  time	  costs	  of	  having	  someone	  protect	  the	  home	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against	  invaders	  (Field,	  2007).	  	  In	  India,	  it	  was	  the	  cost	  of	  paying	  rents	  to	  landlords	  and	  middlemen	  (Besley	  &	  Burgess,	  2000).	  	  In	  former	  Soviet	  states,	  reform	  has	  allowed	  individuals	  to	  respond	  to	  market	  forces	  and	  make	  production	  decisions.	  	  Reducing	  these	  costs	  by	  giving	  formal	  title	  or	  residency	  increases	  the	  income	  of	  the	  participants,	  at	  times	  without	  necessitating	  a	  change	  in	  the	  participant’s	  behavior	  (Besley	  &	  Burgess,	  2000).	  	  The	  key	  to	  these	  programs	  is	  that	  they	  have	  allowed	  households/individuals	  to	  reallocate	  their	  resources	  more	  efficiently.	  	  The	  resulting	  increase	  in	  income,	  in	  these	  cases,	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  food	  insecurity	  and	  a	  greater	  ability	  to	  meet	  household	  needs.	  	   Land	  redistribution	  programs	  that	  give	  land	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not	  currently,	  or	  have	  not	  recently	  farmed	  is	  a	  more	  scarcely	  found	  policy	  option.	  	  In	  Zimbabwe,	  such	  a	  program	  was	  implemented	  after	  liberation	  from	  colonial	  rule	  in	  1980	  (Deininger	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  The	  Deininger	  and	  Klaus	  (2004)	  study	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  program	  found	  that	  participants	  saw	  an	  average	  annual	  increase	  in	  household	  expenditure	  of	  US$17.	  	  While	  small,	  participants	  were	  seeing	  benefits	  attributed	  to	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  program.	  A	  positive	  benefit	  to	  participants	  would	  be	  the	  expected	  result	  from	  South	  Africa’s	  program,	  but	  the	  literature	  suggests	  the	  opposite.	  	  A	  study	  by	  Valente	  (2009)	  found	  participants	  to	  be	  less	  food	  secure	  than	  non-­‐participants.	  	  It	  was	  found	  that	  “beneficiaries	  are	  still	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  difficulties	  in	  satisfying	  their	  food	  needs	  than	  non-­‐participants	  by	  between	  8.4%	  and	  10.2%-­‐points”	  and	  that	  participants’	  “endowments	  would	  have	  been	  better	  rewarded	  in	  terms	  of	  food	  security	  should	  they	  not	  have	  taken	  part	  in	  land	  reform”	  (Valente,	  2009,	  p.	  1546).	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This	  study	  finds	  that	  non-­‐beneficiaries	  are	  better	  off	  than	  participants,	  and	  suggests	  that	  participants	  might	  have	  been	  better	  off	  not	  participating	  in	  the	  program.	  	  This	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  land	  reform	  programs.	  Case	  study	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  Valente’s	  findings.	  	  A	  study	  of	  the	  Community	  Property	  Associations	  (CPA’s)	  -­‐	  groups	  of	  participants	  who	  have	  pooled	  their	  grants	  to	  purchase	  land	  –	  and	  projects	  in	  the	  Northern	  Cape	  found	  that	  most	  participants	  are	  not	  seeing	  higher	  incomes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  program	  (Bradstock,	  2005;	  McCusker,	  2002).	  Most	  individuals	  in	  these	  studies	  spent	  little	  time	  on	  the	  farm,	  collective	  meetings	  were	  only	  attended	  by	  a	  third	  of	  the	  membership,	  and	  members	  pursued	  employment	  in	  other	  areas	  to	  increase	  their	  income.	  	  Time	  spent	  for	  other	  jobs	  reduces	  the	  time	  for	  farming	  and	  so	  reduces	  the	  gains	  from	  participation	  (Bradstock,	  2005).	  	  It	  is	  also	  suggested	  that	  limited	  returns	  to	  involvement	  in	  the	  program	  increases	  disenchantment,	  and	  encourages	  individuals	  to	  stop	  participating	  in	  running/operating	  the	  farm.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  literature	  on	  South	  Africa	  shows	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  does	  not	  benefit	  the	  individual/household.	  	  Instead,	  participants	  are	  more	  food	  insecure	  than	  they	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been,	  and	  income	  is	  not	  increased.	  The	  literature	  contains	  contradictory	  results.	  	  In	  most	  countries,	  land	  reform	  has	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	  participants,	  though	  reform	  has	  mostly	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  tenure	  rights.	  	  Yet	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  effect	  is	  found	  to	  be	  either	  non-­‐existent,	  or	  negative.	  	  This	  paper	  will	  further	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  and	  household	  expenditure,	  food	  insecurity,	  and	  poverty.	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Data	   The	  data	  for	  this	  paper	  comes	  from	  the	  Labor	  Force	  Survey	  by	  Statistics	  South	  Africa,	  the	  national	  statistics	  office.	  	  Observations	  are	  both	  on	  the	  household	  and	  the	  individual	  level.	  	  A	  section	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  dedicated	  to	  questions	  regarding	  the	  household.	  	  These	  include	  material	  possessions	  (e.g.	  telephone,	  television,	  car),	  as	  well	  as	  aspects	  of	  the	  home	  (e.g.	  material	  of	  walls/roof).	  	  There	  are	  also	  several	  sections	  regarding	  the	  individual	  (i.e.	  work	  status,	  personal	  information,	  education).	  	  Each	  individual	  in	  the	  data	  set	  is	  identified	  with	  a	  household.	  	  The	  2001	  to	  2004	  waves	  of	  the	  survey	  are	  pooled	  together	  to	  create	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  data	  set.	  To	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  participation,	  this	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  household	  level	  data,	  with	  individual	  observations	  of	  the	  head	  of	  household	  (HOH).	  	  Individual	  data	  for	  each	  respondent	  cannot	  be	  used	  because	  of	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  question	  on	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  The	  question	  reads	  “Have	  you	  or	  anyone	  in	  the	  household…”	  so	  using	  all	  respondents	  to	  the	  survey	  could	  result	  in	  double	  counting.	  	  One	  concern	  about	  using	  the	  household	  is	  that	  household	  composition	  is	  dynamic,	  and	  so	  identification	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  program	  could	  be	  for	  a	  respondent	  who	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  particular	  household	  at	  the	  time	  of	  participation.	  	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  program	  was	  only	  in	  effect	  for	  between	  4	  and	  8	  years	  when	  the	  responses	  were	  taken	  household	  change	  less	  likely.	  	  Using	  the	  HOH	  for	  individual	  indicators	  is	  appropriate,	  as	  they	  are	  most	  likely	  earning	  the	  most	  income	  or	  direct	  the	  economic	  decisions	  of	  the	  household.	  	  As	  such,	  they	  would	  be	  most	  important	  in	  making	  the	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	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Dependent	  Variables	  This	  paper	  will	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  on	  three	  measures	  of	  welfare:	  household	  expenditure,	  poverty,	  and	  food	  insecurity.	  	  The	  coding	  of	  household	  expenditure	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  detailed	  analysis	  as	  it	  is	  not	  a	  continuous	  variable,	  but	  asks	  respondents	  to	  place	  their	  expenditure	  within	  a	  range	  of	  values	  (See	  Table	  3).	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  expenditure	  variable	  does	  not	  account	  for	  household	  production.	  	  However,	  using	  the	  median	  values	  of	  each	  bin	  in	  a	  regression	  analysis,	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  rough	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  participation	  and	  expenditure1.	  	  In	  addition,	  per	  capita	  household	  expenditure	  is	  constructed	  for	  a	  further	  analysis	  providing	  a	  second	  method	  of	  control	  for	  household	  size.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  household	  lies	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  This	  is	  a	  constructed	  binary	  variable	  using	  the	  official	  poverty	  line	  developed	  by	  the	  South	  African	  Treasury	  Ministry	  and	  Statistics	  South	  Africa	  (Statistics	  South	  Africa,	  2007).	  	  Poverty	  is	  defined	  as	  having	  less	  than	  R322	  ($46.11).	  	  This	  per	  capita	  household	  expenditure	  measure	  is	  slightly	  crude.	  	  Each	  household	  that	  identified	  in	  the	  lowest	  bin	  of	  expenditure	  (R	  0-­‐400)	  is	  captured	  as	  living	  under	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  However,	  households	  with	  one	  member	  who	  identify	  in	  this	  bin	  may	  spend	  above	  the	  poverty	  line	  but	  be	  captured	  as	  being	  in	  poverty.	  Yet,	  this	  variable	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  broader	  measure	  than	  expenditure,	  and	  it	  another	  means	  to	  evaluate	  the	  policy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  All	  values	  are	  adjusted	  for	  inflation	  using	  2000	  as	  the	  base	  year.	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The	  final	  dependent	  variable	  used	  is	  food	  insecurity.	  	  Each	  household	  is	  asked	  to	  report	  if	  they	  have	  had	  difficulty	  meeting	  their	  food	  needs	  within	  the	  last	  year.	  	  While	  self-­‐reporting	  can	  at	  times	  be	  difficult,	  with	  food	  insecurity	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  measurement	  error	  (Valente,	  2009).	  	  The	  available	  responses	  are:	  never,	  rarely,	  sometimes,	  often	  and	  always.	  	  For	  this	  analysis,	  every	  household	  that	  reports	  sometimes,	  often	  or	  always	  is	  classified	  as	  food	  insecure.	  	  This	  follows	  the	  analysis	  of	  Valente	  (2009)	  and	  Deninger	  (2004).	  	  Households	  that	  are	  more	  food	  insecure	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  poorer	  than	  food	  secure	  households.	  	  
Control	  Variables	  In	  order	  to	  minimize	  any	  variable	  bias	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  participation	  and	  expenditure,	  poverty,	  or	  food	  insecurity	  I	  will	  also	  include	  a	  series	  of	  controls.	  	  These	  are:	  race,	  province	  of	  residence,	  age,	  the	  education	  level	  of	  the	  head	  of	  household,	  household	  size,	  children	  under	  age	  15,	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  farming.	  	  Reason	  for	  farming	  is	  a	  categorical	  variable	  capturing	  the	  household’s	  main	  purpose	  in	  farming.	  	  Responses	  are:	  as	  a	  source	  of	  food,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  income,	  as	  extra	  sources	  of	  food	  or	  income,	  or	  as	  a	  hobby.	  	  Each	  reason	  is	  controlled	  for	  as	  a	  separate	  binary	  variable.	  	  Including	  this	  control	  allows	  a	  means	  of	  holding	  constant	  how	  serious	  the	  household	  is	  about	  farming.	  	  Households	  that	  use	  farming	  as	  a	  source	  of	  food	  or	  income	  are	  likely	  to	  work	  harder	  or	  emphasize	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  farm	  more	  than	  individuals	  who	  are	  farming	  as	  a	  hobby.	  	  Therefore	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  some	  unobserved	  characteristics	  regarding	  participants	  in	  the	  program.	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  The	  data	  are	  limited	  in	  two	  key	  ways.	  	  First,	  the	  question	  of	  participation	  does	  not	  include	  a	  date	  of	  when	  the	  grant	  was	  received.	  	  This	  excludes	  any	  before	  and	  after	  analysis	  of	  the	  benefits	  to	  participation.	  	  It	  also	  precludes	  discussion	  or	  examination	  of	  lagged	  benefits.	  	  If,	  for	  example,	  it	  takes	  three	  years	  for	  benefits	  to	  involvement	  to	  accrue,	  this	  cannot	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  data.	  	  Second,	  the	  survey	  is	  designed	  to	  study	  labor	  participation,	  not	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  Therefore	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  program	  such	  as:	  hours	  spent	  farming,	  loans	  for	  the	  farm,	  land	  use,	  crop	  yield,	  farm	  income,	  or	  access	  to	  extension	  services	  (on	  site	  training)	  are	  not	  present.	  	  Despite	  these	  limitations,	  the	  LFS	  is	  a	  useful	  data	  set	  through	  which	  to	  study	  the	  South	  African	  redistribution	  program.	  	  
Methodology	  	   To	  obtain	  a	  full	  analysis	  of	  the	  program’s	  effect	  on	  poverty,	  three	  separate	  models	  will	  be	  used.	  	  First	  an	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  (OLS)	  regression	  will	  provide	  a	  broad	  analysis	  of	  participation’s	  effect	  on	  household	  expenditure.	  A	  probit	  equation	  will	  model	  the	  effect	  of	  participation	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  food	  secure	  and	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  Finally,	  a	  basic	  propensity	  score	  match	  (PSM)	  will	  allow	  a	  comparison	  of	  like	  households	  by	  matching	  the	  probability	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  program.	  	  Using	  the	  match,	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  of	  the	  treated	  is	  calculated,	  indicating	  the	  effect	  of	  participation	  as	  compared	  to	  households	  with	  similar	  characteristics.	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Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  	   An	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  model	  tests	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  redistribution	  program	  positively	  impacts	  welfare	  as	  measured	  by	  household	  expenditure.	  	  Household	  expenditure	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  log	  of	  household	  expenditure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  log	  of	  per	  capita	  household	  expenditure.	  	  This	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  meaningful	  interpretation	  and	  results,	  as	  a	  one-­‐dollar	  increase	  would	  mean	  a	  lot	  to	  the	  poor,	  but	  little	  to	  the	  rich.	  	  However,	  a	  one	  percent	  increase	  would	  be	  meaningful	  to	  both	  groups.	  	  	  The	  simplest	  expression	  of	  the	  OLS	  regression	  is	  a	  bivariate	  expression	  written	  as:	   log ℎℎ!"#!$% ! =   ! +   !!!"! +   !! 	  	  where	  LG	  is	  a	  binary	  variable	  with	  1	  indicating	  the	  household	  participates	  in	  the	  redistribution	  program.	  	  This	  equation	  does	  not	  fully	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  expenditure	  and	  redistribution	  due	  to	  an	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  	  In	  order	  to	  control	  for	  other	  factors	  that	  may	  influence	  expenditure,	  a	  series	  of	  dummy	  variables	  are	  included.	  	  These	  will	  control	  for	  race,	  province	  of	  residence,	  gender,	  household	  size,	  survey	  year,	  HOH’s	  age	  and	  the	  number	  of	  children	  under	  age	  15	  in	  the	  house:	   log ℎℎ!"#!$% ! =   ! +   !!!"! +   !!!"#$! +   !!!"#$! 	  +  !!!"#$! +   !!!"#! + !"#!! +   !!!"#$ +   !!ℎℎ!"#$! + !!!ℎ!"15! +   !! 	  	  While	  these	  controls	  help	  to	  explain	  expenditure	  in	  South	  Africa	  because	  of	  racial,	  regional,	  and	  age	  differences,	  they	  do	  not	  control	  for	  characteristics	  that	  may	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effect	  a	  household’s	  welfare	  position;	  such	  as	  education	  or	  reason	  for	  farming.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  include	  these	  controls	  in	  the	  following	  specification:	  	  log ℎℎ!"#!$% ! =   ! +   !!!"! + !!!!   +   !!!"#$%&'()! +   !!"!"#$%&! + !! 	  	  where	  education	  is	  a	  series	  of	  dummies	  about	  educational	  attainment,	  reason	  is	  a	  series	  of	  dummies	  capturing	  the	  main	  reason	  the	  household	  farms,	  and	  X	  is	  all	  other	  controls	  previously	  mentioned.	  	  This	  fully	  expressed	  regression	  model	  holds	  as	  many	  observed	  characteristics	  constant	  as	  possible,	  and	  should	  limit	  any	  bias	  to	  unobserved	  variables.	  	  However,	  there	  remains	  a	  concern	  that	  unobservable	  personal	  characteristics	  –	  such	  as	  motivation,	  and	  land	  quality	  –	  may	  be	  biasing	  the	  results.	  	   	  
Probit	  Models	  	   As	  another	  avenue	  of	  analysis,	  food	  security	  and	  poverty	  are	  used	  as	  dependent	  variables.	  A	  probit	  model	  is	  necessary	  for	  this	  analysis	  as	  food	  security	  and	  poverty	  are	  binary	  variables,	  and	  the	  probit	  allows	  the	  relationship	  to	  be	  non-­‐linear.	  	  Food	  security	  is	  measured	  with	  a	  binary	  variable	  where	  a	  1	  indicates	  households	  who	  report	  that	  they	  have	  trouble	  meeting	  their	  food	  needs	  sometimes,	  often,	  or	  always.	  	  Poverty	  is	  a	  binary	  variable	  with	  a	  1	  indicating	  that	  the	  household’s	  per	  capita	  expenditure	  is	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  of	  R322,	  as	  calculated	  by	  the	  Treasury	  of	  South	  Africa	  (Statistics	  South	  Africa,	  2007).	  	  	  	   The	  equations	  for	  these	  two	  models	  will	  follow	  the	  form	  of:	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Υ! =   ! +   !!!! +   !! 	  where	  Υi	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  variable	  being	  1	  and	  Xi	  is	  the	  vector	  of	  determining	  factors.	  	  The	  probability	  of	  food	  security	  is	  measured	  by:	  	  !""#$%&! =   ! +   !!!"! + !!!"#$%&'(! +   !!!"#$! +   !!!"#$! +   !!"!"#$%&! +   !! 	  	  where:	  foodins	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  food	  insecurity,	  personal	  are	  controls	  of	  race,	  province,	  survey	  year,	  age,	  and	  gender	  and	  reason	  is	  the	  household’s	  reason	  for	  farming.	  	  	   The	  model	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  living	  in	  poverty	  is:	  	   !"#$%&'! =   ! +   !!!"! +   !!!"#$%&'(! +   !!!"#$! +   !!!"#$! + !!"!"#$%&! + !! 	  	  controlling	  for	  the	  same	  factors	  as	  above.	  	  	   Propensity	  Score	  Match	  	   In	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  participation’s	  effect	  on	  food	  insecurity	  and	  poverty	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  convincing	  counterfactual.	  	  Because	  the	  data	  is	  crossectional,	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  participant	  households	  are	  better	  off	  than	  before	  participation.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  the	  closest	  counterfactual	  I	  will	  use	  a	  propensity	  score	  match	  to	  pair	  and	  compare	  each	  treated	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household	  with	  the	  untreated	  household	  that	  is	  most	  similar	  (Godtland,	  Sadoulet,	  De	  Janvry,	  Murgai,	  and	  Ortiz,	  2004).	  	   First,	  a	  probit	  model	  predicts	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  household	  would	  participate	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  Then,	  the	  predicted	  value	  of	  each	  household	  is	  calculated	  and	  each	  participant	  is	  matched	  with	  a	  non-­‐participant	  using	  nearest	  neighbor	  matching	  (Deininger	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Valente,	  2009).	  	  Finally,	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  of	  the	  treated	  is	  calculated.	  	   Following	  the	  above	  probit	  models,	  the	  predictor	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  is	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	   !"! =   ! +   !!!"#$%&'(! +   !!!"#$! +   !!!"#$! + !!"!"#$%&! + !! 	  	  These	  variables	  are	  expected	  to	  explain	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  The	  model	  is	  specified	  in	  this	  manner	  as	  the	  program	  is	  targeted	  toward	  black	  participants	  who	  live	  in	  poverty.	  	  It	  is	  also	  probable	  that	  individuals	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  education,	  and	  reasons	  for	  farming,	  such	  as	  for	  food	  or	  income,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  program.	  	  Finally,	  the	  propensity	  score	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  as	  many	  personal	  attributes	  as	  possible,	  therefore	  it	  is	  beneficial	  to	  include	  many	  determinants	  to	  get	  the	  closest	  match	  of	  participant	  and	  non-­‐participant	  households	  as	  possible.	  	   Using	  this	  model	  the	  predicted	  value	  of	  each	  household	  is	  given	  as:	  	   !"! =   ! +   !!!"#$%&'(! +   !!!"#$! +   !!!"#$! + !!"!"#$%&! 	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  where	  LG	  is	  the	  predicted	  value	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  for	  each	  household.	  	  	  The	  predicted	  value	  is	  then	  used	  as	  the	  propensity	  score	  for	  each	  household.	  	  Each	  participant	  household	  is	  matched	  with	  a	  non-­‐participant	  household	  with	  the	  nearest	  propensity	  score	  (nearest	  neighbor	  matching)	  in	  absolute	  value.	  	   The	  Average	  Treatment	  Effect	  on	  the	  Treated	  (ATE)	  is	  then	  calculated	  as	  the	  “expected	  difference	  in	  observed	  outcomes	  between	  participants	  and	  matched	  nonparticipants”	  (Francesconi	  and	  Heerink,	  2011;	  Godtland	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  If	  the	  propensity	  scores	  are	  identical	  then	  the	  equation	  is:	  	   ! !! − !! ! !" =   ! ! !" = 1,! !" −   ![!|!" = 0,! !" ]	  	  where	  	  LG	  is	  the	  propensity	  score	  (or	  probability	  of	  participation),	  and	  LG	  is	  the	  indicator	  of	  treatment,	  and	  y	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  interest	  (either	  food	  insecurity	  or	  poverty).	  	  Averaging	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  expected	  values	  lends	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  of	  the	  treated:	  	   !"#! = !{! ! !" = 1,! !" −   ! ! !" = 0,! !" }	  	  	   This	  method	  allows	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  reasonable	  counterfactuals	  from	  which	  to	  compare	  participant	  households.	  	  It	  also	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  as	  many	  personal	  characteristics	  as	  possible.	  	  However,	  unobservable	  personal	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characteristics	  may	  still	  bias	  the	  results.	  	  Households	  may	  have	  identical	  observable	  characteristics,	  and	  still	  be	  different	  on	  characteristics	  such	  as	  motivation.	  	  
Results	  
Descriptive	  Statistics	  The	  population	  is	  young	  and	  predominantly	  male	  (60%).	  	  Approximately	  90%	  of	  the	  population	  is	  between	  the	  working	  ages	  of	  18	  and	  69.	  	  	  Additionally,	  76%	  of	  the	  sample	  is	  black,	  39%	  are	  food	  insecure,	  and	  the	  average	  household	  has	  4.2	  members	  (See	  Table	  1).	  	  Not	  surprisingly	  for	  a	  developing	  country,	  90%	  of	  South	  Africans	  have	  less	  than	  a	  high	  school	  degree	  (Table	  4).	  	  This	  low	  education	  level	  could	  be	  important	  if	  it	  is	  correlated	  with	  less	  agricultural	  knowledge	  or	  basic	  skills.	  	  More	  than	  half	  of	  households	  spend	  less	  than	  R	  1,000	  ($143)	  per	  month	  (see	  Table	  3).	  	   Of	  the	  sample	  2.2%	  participates	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  Without	  a	  direct	  relation	  between	  how	  much	  land	  each	  participant	  receives	  per	  grant	  (as	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  desired	  land)	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  correlate	  the	  percent	  of	  land	  redistributed	  (estimated	  at	  5%)	  and	  the	  participation	  level	  (Valente,	  2009).	  	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  sample	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  participant	  households.	  
Table	  1:	  Population	  Means	  
	  	   Percent	   	  	   Percent	  
Poverty	   67.74	   Population	  Group	  
Male	   60.48	   African/Black	   76.47	  
Female	   39.52	   Coloured	   10.74	  
Working	  Age	   89.85	   Indian/Asian	   2.15	  
Food	  Insecure	   34.03	   White	   10.57	  
Household	  Size	   4.21	   Other	   0.07	  
Household	  Expenditure	   R	  1,418	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Table	  2:	  Comparing	  Participant	  Means	  










Poverty	   67.55	   78.49	   77.64	   82.02	  
Male	  	  	  	   60.51	   58.06	   56.19	   55.99	  
Female	   39.49	   41.94	   43.81	   44.01	  
Working	  Age	   89.86	   89.52	   89.67	   89.3	  
Food	  Insecure	   33.68	   48.25	   40.59	   50.9	  
HH	  Size	   4.21	   4.53	   4.33	   4.57	  
HH	  Expend.	   1426.61	   1058.37	   908.4	   890.5222	  	  	   Comparing	  participants	  with	  non-­‐participant	  households,	  key	  characteristics	  are	  not	  much	  different.	  	  A	  greater	  proportion	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  program	  are	  black	  (89%)	  than	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Eleven	  percent	  more	  participants	  are	  below	  the	  poverty	  line,	  and	  15	  percent	  more	  of	  participants	  are	  food	  insecure	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  With	  regard	  to	  expenditure,	  households	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  program	  are	  approximately	  7	  percentage	  points	  more	  likely	  to	  spend	  less	  than	  R1,000	  than	  non-­‐participants,	  though	  both	  groups	  are	  heavily	  weighted	  toward	  lower	  levels	  of	  expenditure.	  	  A	  lager	  share	  of	  participant	  HOH’s	  have	  less	  than	  some	  secondary	  education.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  interestingly,	  participants	  are	  more	  equally	  divided	  between	  men	  and	  women	  heads	  of	  households	  (58/42)	  than	  non-­‐participants	  (61/39).	  	  While	  the	  change	  is	  not	  large,	  it	  is	  an	  interesting	  fact	  to	  note.	  Lower	  levels	  of	  household	  expenditure,	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  poverty	  and	  food	  insecurity	  for	  participants	  indicate	  the	  program’s	  targeting	  of	  the	  poor.	  	  	  As	  such,	  participants	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  are	  less	  well	  off	  than	  non-­‐participants.
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Table	  3:	  Household	  Expenditure	  





Participants	   Non-­‐Participant	  
	  	  	  	  	  Percent	   Cum.	   	  	  	  	  	  Percent	   Cum.	   	  	  	  	  	  Percent	   Cum.	  
0	  -­‐	  399	   200	   28.51	   28.51	   32.38	   32.38	   28.4	   28.4	  
400	  -­‐	  799	   600	   29.89	   58.4	   32.38	   64.76	   29.85	   58.26	  
800	  -­‐	  1199	   1000	   13.8	   72.2	   14.57	   79.34	   13.78	   72.04	  
1200	  -­‐	  1799	   1500	   8.07	   80.26	   7.37	   86.71	   8.08	   80.12	  
1800	  -­‐	  2499	   2050	   5.88	   86.14	   4.9	   91.61	   5.91	   86.02	  
2500	  -­‐	  4999	   3750	   7.49	   93.63	   5.5	   97.1	   7.53	   93.55	  
5000	  -­‐	  9999	   7500	   4.6	   98.23	   2.13	   99.23	   4.65	   98.21	  
10000	  +	   10000	   1.77	   100	   0.77	   100	   1.79	   100	  
	  	   	  	  
	   	  
Black	  Households	  
Household	  Expenditure	  Bins	  
Household	  
Expenditure	  
Population	   Participants	   Non-­‐participants	  
	  	  	  	  	  Percent	   Cum.	   Percent	   Cum.	   Percent	   Cum.	  
0	  -­‐	  399	   200	   28.51	   28.51	   34.53	   34.53	   34.38	   34.38	  
400	  -­‐	  799	   600	   29.89	   58.4	   33.9	   68.42	   34.17	   68.55	  
800	  -­‐	  1199	   1000	   13.8	   72.2	   14.6	   83.03	   14.13	   82.68	  
1200	  -­‐	  1799	   1500	   8.07	   80.26	   7.06	   90.09	   7.16	   89.85	  
1800	  -­‐	  2499	   2050	   5.88	   86.14	   4.06	   94.15	   4.22	   94.07	  
2500	  -­‐	  4999	   3750	   7.49	   93.63	   4.35	   98.5	   4.11	   98.17	  
5000	  -­‐	  9999	   7500	   4.6	   98.23	   1.21	   99.71	   1.49	   99.66	  
10000	  +	   10000	   1.77	   100	   0.29	   100	   0.34	   100	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Table	  4:	  Comparing	  Participants	  and	  Non-­‐Participants	  
	  	   Government	  Land	  Grant	   	  	  
	  	  
Non-­‐
Participants	   Participants	   Total	  
Reason	  for	  farming	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
As	  a	  main	  source	  of	  food	   1.77	   2.18	   1.78	  
As	  the	  main	  source	  of	  Income	   0.91	   2.35	   0.95	  
As	  an	  extra	  source	  of	  Income	   0.83	   1.63	   0.85	  
As	  an	  extra	  source	  of	  Food	   13.56	   11.1	   13.5	  
As	  a	  leisure	  activity	   0.8	   0.67	   0.8	  
Not	  applicable	   82.13	   82.07	   82.13	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Main	  source	  of	  income	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Salaries	  and/or	  wages	   56.79	   52.92	   56.7	  
Remittances	   13.11	   12.41	   13.1	  
Pensions	  and	  grants	   21.74	   23.93	   21.79	  
Sales	  of	  farm	  product	   1.03	   1.84	   1.05	  
Other	  non-­‐farm	  income	   5.36	   6.6	   5.39	  
No	  income	   1.88	   2.17	   1.89	  
Unspecified	   0.08	   0.13	   0.08	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Educational	  Attainment	  
	   	  
	  	  
No	  School	   17.3	   21.3	   17.39	  
Some	  Primary	   30.6	   34.9	   30.69	  
Some	  Secondary	   42.52	   39.03	   42.44	  
High	  School	  Degree	   0.89	   0.3	   0.87	  
Some	  College	   4.55	   1.96	   4.49	  
Graduate	   2.08	   1.24	   2.06	  
Post	  Graduate	   2.07	   1.28	   2.06	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   Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  	   The	  regression	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  participants	  are	  not	  receiving	  benefits	  of	  higher	  household	  expenditure	  through	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  (Table	  5).	  	  Without	  controls	  in	  regression	  (Column	  1)	  participants	  spend	  an	  average	  of	  18%	  less	  than	  non-­‐participants.	  	  Without	  controls	  however,	  this	  could	  simply	  be	  because	  participants	  are	  poorer	  than	  non-­‐participants	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  Once	  additional	  controls	  are	  included,	  participation	  in	  the	  program	  remains	  negative	  but	  smaller	  in	  magnitude,	  though	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Spending	  increases	  slightly	  with	  age,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  each	  additional	  person	  living	  in	  the	  household,	  though	  children	  under	  15	  reduce	  expenditure,	  perhaps	  reflecting	  their	  smaller	  monetary	  demands	  for	  essentials	  (Column	  2).	  	  Each	  reason	  for	  farming	  is	  positive	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  omitted	  source	  of	  food	  (Column	  3).	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  farming	  as	  a	  source	  of	  food	  might	  reduce	  expenditure.	  	  This	  would	  follow	  if	  households	  reduce	  spending	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  food	  not	  purchased.	  	  All	  race	  variables	  are	  positive,	  suggesting	  all	  races	  spend	  more	  than	  black	  households.	  	  Province	  coefficients	  are	  also	  all	  negative,	  reflecting	  that	  the	  omitted	  Western	  Cape	  is	  the	  richest	  province	  in	  the	  country.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  examine	  expenditure	  thoroughly,	  regressions	  were	  also	  run	  using	  per	  capita	  expenditure	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (Table	  5,	  Columns	  4-­‐6).	  	  Following	  the	  same	  pattern	  participation	  is	  initially	  negative	  and	  becomes	  smaller	  in	  magnitude.	  	  However,	  with	  per	  capita	  expenditure	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  participation	  is	  statistically	  significant	  from	  zero.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  participants	  spend	  less	  than	  non-­‐participants;	  or	  participants	  are	  not	  benefiting	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Table 5: Regression Results of Land Grant on Household Expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log of Household Expenditure 
Log Per Capita Household 
Expenditure 
              
Government Land grant -0.188*** -0.0250 -0.0230 -0.308*** -0.0830*** -0.0841*** 
 





























   Num. People in Household 
 
0.0535*** 0.0606*** 
































































































Table 5: Regression Results of Land Grant on Household Expenditure (cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log of Household Expenditure 
Log Per Capita Household 
Expenditure 
 


















Constant 6.608*** 5.412*** 4.452*** 5.253*** 5.381*** 4.383*** 
 
(0.00338) (0.0243) (0.0304) (0.00390) (0.0264) (0.0334) 
       Observations 106,064 105,819 103,873 106,064 105,819 103,873 
R-squared 0.001 0.334 0.430 0.001 0.417 0.488 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     Note: Race, Province, Year omitted from output, see Appendix I for full 
results 
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from	  the	  government	  program.	  
Probit	  	   Positive	  results	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  on	  food	  insecurity	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  Valente	  (2009)	  study.	  	  (See	  Table	  6,	  Appendix	  II)	  	  Participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  household	  will	  be	  food	  insecure	  by	  approximately	  fifteen	  percentage	  points	  (Column	  1).	  	  However,	  this	  could	  simply	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  poverty	  of	  those	  most	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  program.	  	  Yet	  the	  inclusion	  of	  further	  determinants	  (race	  province,	  gender,	  and	  reason	  for	  farming)	  still	  returns	  positive	  results	  to	  participation	  on	  food	  insecurity	  (Column	  2).	  	  While	  the	  probability	  is	  reduced	  from	  fifteen	  percentage	  points	  more	  to	  six	  percentage	  points	  more,	  it	  is	  still	  surprising	  that	  participants	  would	  be	  so	  much	  less	  food	  secure.	  	  	  A	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  those	  who	  are	  participating	  in	  the	  program	  as	  a	  source	  of	  food	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  swings	  in	  agriculture	  fortunes.	  	  Given	  the	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  crop	  yields,	  these	  households’	  food	  security	  would	  be	  more	  exposed	  to	  volatile	  changes	  in	  food	  production.	  	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  6,	  as	  those	  farming	  for	  a	  source	  of	  food	  are	  approximately	  8	  percentage	  points	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  food	  insecure	  than	  those	  farming	  for	  other	  reasons.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  this	  explains	  the	  entire	  result	  suggesting	  that	  participants	  are	  less	  food	  secure	  as	  a	  result	  of	  participation,	  or	  an	  unobserved	  difference.	  	   The	  probit	  model	  predicting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  experiencing	  poverty	  of	  those	  participating	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  indicates	  that	  participation	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  in	  poverty.	  	  Alone,	  participation	  would	  increase	  the	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Table 6: Marginal Effects from Probit Models 
  Food Insecurity (1) Food Insecurity (2) Poverty (1) Poverty (2) 
  Margin Std. Error Margin  Std. Error Margin Std. Error Margin Std Error 
         Non-Participant 0.337 0.001 0.341 0.001 0.676 0.001 0.683 0.001 




























































































































































         Note: For Probit results see Appendix II 
       Note: Marginal effects are differences between categories. 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects, Receiving a Land Grant 
  Margin	   Std.	  Err.	  
NRace 
  
African/Black 0.026 0.001 
Coloured 0.013 0.001 
Indian/Asian 0.007 0.002 
White 0.006 0.001 
Other 0.011 0.011 
Province 
  Western Cape 0.023 0.002 
Eastern Cape 0.027 0.001 
Northern Cape 0.046 0.003 
Free State 0.005 0.001 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.009 0.001 
North West 0.021 0.001 
Guateng 0.015 0.001 
Mpumalanga 0.073 0.003 
Limpopo 0.013 0.001 
Survey Year 
  2001	   0.025 0.001 
2002	   0.020 0.001 
2003	   0.012 0.001 
2004	   0.030 0.001 
Education 
  No School 0.020 0.001 
Some Primary Education 0.022 0.001 
Some Secondary Education 0.024 0.001 
High School Degree 0.016 0.006 
Some College 0.015 0.002 
College Degree 0.024 0.004 
Graduate Studies 0.019 0.003 
Reason 
  Source of Food 0.022 0.003 
Source of Income 0.071 0.009 
Extra Income 0.034 0.005 
Extra Food 0.016 0.001 
Hobby 0.016 0.004 
No Farm 0.023 0.001 
Gender 
  Male 0.022 0.001 
Female 0.022 0.001 
Note: For Full Probit results see Appendix III 
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probability	  by	  11	  percentage	  points,	  however	  when	  controlling	  for	  race	  and	  region	  the	  marginal	  effects	  are	  only	  1	  percentage	  point	  above	  non-­‐participants.	  	  However	  it	  is	  not	  statistically	  different	  from	  zero.	  	  Thus,	  participating	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  in	  poverty,	  though	  neither	  does	  participation	  reduce	  the	  likelihood.	  	  	   Propensity	  Score	  Match	  	   The	  probit	  depicting	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  household	  receives	  a	  land	  grant	  suggests	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  generally	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  household	  participates.	  	  Participation	  is	  also	  more	  likely	  as	  the	  HOH	  gets	  older,	  and	  households	  that	  rely	  on	  farming	  for	  food	  or	  income	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  program.	  
Table	  8:	  Average	  Treatment	  of	  Treated,	  Food	  Insecurity	  and	  Poverty	  
Variable	   Sample	   Participants	   Non-­‐
Participants	  
Difference	   S.E.	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
Food	  
Insecurity	   Unmatched	   0.4852 0.3395 0.1457 0.0099 
	  	   ATT	   0.4852 0.4064 0.0788 0.0148 
	  	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Poverty	   Unmatched	   0.7901 0.6808 0.1094 0.0097 
	  	   ATT	   0.7901 0.7512 0.0390 0.0126 	  The	  results	  of	  the	  propensity	  score	  match	  display	  that	  the	  redistribution	  program	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  not	  benefiting	  participants.	  	  The	  average	  treatment	  effect	  of	  the	  treated	  is	  approximately	  8	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  the	  non-­‐treated	  (Table	  8).	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  participants	  are	  8	  percentage	  points	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  food	  insecure	  than	  non-­‐participants.	  	  The	  same	  model	  on	  the	  poverty	  indicator	  also	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yields	  that	  participants	  are	  3	  percentage	  points	  more	  likely	  to	  live	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  than	  non-­‐participants.	  	  	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  unobservable	  are	  correlated	  with	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  This	  could	  potentially	  negatively	  bias	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study.	  	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  participants	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  they	  were	  to	  direct	  their	  efforts	  towards	  other	  means	  of	  improving	  their	  livelihoods.	  	  	  	  
Discussion	  Negative	  benefits	  to	  participation	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  limited	  state	  assistance	  to	  new	  farmers.	  	  South	  Africa	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  of	  its	  land	  reform	  program	  have	  never	  farmed	  –	  at	  least	  on	  a	  commercial	  scale.	  	  In	  Zimbabwe,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  extension	  services	  (education	  in	  planning,	  harvesting,	  markets)	  resulted	  in	  double-­‐digit	  gains	  in	  output	  and	  income	  (Owens,	  Hoddinott,	  &	  Kinsey,	  2003).	  	  However,	  in	  South	  Africa	  these	  services	  are	  rarely	  provided,	  either	  from	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  or	  funding	  (Deininger,	  1999;	  Lahiff,	  2007).	  	  While	  extension	  services	  are	  no	  panacea,	  it	  could	  aid	  in	  reducing	  negative	  experiences.	  The	  presence	  of	  unobserved	  differences	  between	  participants	  and	  non-­‐participants	  are	  biasing	  the	  results.	  	  Due	  to	  data	  limitations	  discussed	  earlier,	  mainly	  that	  the	  data	  set	  is	  not	  constructed	  to	  study	  the	  land	  grant	  program,	  unobservable	  characteristics	  may	  present	  in	  the	  errors	  correlating	  with	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  would	  bias	  the	  results	  to	  the	  study.	  	  Possible	  characteristics	  that	  should	  be	  included	  in	  further	  research	  are:	  land	  quality,	  whether	  the	  participant	  is	  in	  a	  CPA,	  the	  CPA’s	  size,	  time	  spent	  farming,	  CPA	  meetings	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attended,	  farm	  specific	  spending,	  and	  importance	  of	  participation,	  among	  others.	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  these	  characteristics	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  complete	  control	  or	  matching	  of	  participant	  and	  non-­‐participant	  characteristics	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  ‘true’	  effect	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program.	  The	  negative	  results	  on	  household	  expenditure,	  food	  security	  and	  poverty,	  could	  also	  be	  a	  result	  of	  several	  factors	  of	  program	  design.	  	  First,	  the	  best	  land	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	  been	  transferred	  as	  part	  of	  the	  program.	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  many	  households	  are	  not	  putting	  in	  the	  effort	  needed	  on	  the	  farm.	  	  Only	  two	  percent	  of	  grant	  recipients	  receive	  their	  main	  source	  of	  income	  from	  farming,	  and	  most	  participants	  are	  not	  farming	  at	  all	  suggesting	  that	  there	  are	  limited	  incentives	  to	  put	  forth	  full	  effort	  to	  farm	  (Table	  4,	  Main	  Source	  of	  Income).	  	  Finally,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  CPAs	  may	  be	  limiting	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  projects.	  	  Some	  groups	  included	  more	  than	  400	  members	  (Lahiff,	  2007;	  McCusker,	  2002).	  	  The	  collective	  nature	  also	  resulted	  in	  non-­‐participation	  and	  difficulties	  in	  making	  decisions.	  	  While	  it	  is	  not	  known	  why	  people	  do	  not	  participate,	  in	  several	  case	  studies	  (Bradstock,	  2005;	  Lahiff,	  2007;	  Valente,	  2011)	  it	  was	  found	  that	  there	  were	  some	  participants	  who	  were	  enticed	  by	  program	  leaders	  for	  their	  grant	  money.	  	  It	  is	  also	  thought	  that	  after	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  little	  or	  no	  returns,	  and	  general	  frustration,	  that	  some	  households	  choose	  to	  give	  up	  on	  their	  farmland.	  	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  contract	  of	  the	  CPAs,	  some	  participants	  may	  still	  be	  required	  to	  make	  financial	  contributions	  to	  the	  projects.	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Conclusion	  The	  literature	  finds	  evidence	  that	  land	  reform	  programs	  in	  developing	  countries	  work	  to	  improve	  the	  income	  and	  welfare	  of	  participants.	  	  A	  study	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  program	  in	  2009	  found	  the	  opposite	  with	  regard	  to	  food	  security.	  	  This	  paper	  provides	  further	  evidence	  that	  such	  a	  negative	  relationship	  exists	  within	  South	  Africa’s	  program.	  The	  econometric	  approach	  of	  this	  paper	  has	  covered	  several	  key	  topics.	  	  First,	  OLS	  regressions	  found	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  land	  redistribution	  program	  spent	  less	  on	  average	  than	  non-­‐participants.	  	  This	  was	  found	  to	  hold	  true	  in	  probit	  analysis	  of	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  trouble	  meeting	  food	  needs	  (food	  insecurity).	  	  Results	  of	  this	  study	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  data	  limitations.	  	  The	  inability	  to	  control	  for	  unobservable	  characteristics	  of	  participants	  and	  land,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  construction	  of	  household	  expenditure	  prevents	  determining	  a	  causal	  link.	  	  These	  limits	  might	  also	  bias	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Thus,	  I	  cannot	  rule	  out	  that	  the	  error	  terms	  are	  correlated	  with	  participation,	  and	  that	  the	  negative	  results	  are	  driven	  by	  unobservable	  characteristics	  of	  participants.	  	  South	  Africa’s	  program	  is	  not	  providing	  benefits	  to	  participants	  in	  the	  form	  of	  increased	  household	  expenditure	  or	  reduced	  food	  insecurity.	  	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  land	  transferred,	  the	  size	  of	  collective	  organizations,	  or	  lingering	  contractual	  obligations.	  	  Whatever	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  negative	  results,	  the	  government	  of	  South	  Africa	  should	  reform	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  program	  to	  address	  such	  issues	  if	  redistribution	  is	  expected	  to	  positively	  benefit	  program	  participants.	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Further	  research	  in	  this	  area	  should	  focus	  on	  creating	  a	  comprehensive	  data	  set	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  before/after	  comparison,	  or	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  participant	  households.	  	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  deeper	  comparisons	  of	  determinants	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  land	  grant	  program	  and	  its	  effects.	  	  More	  detailed	  surveys	  pertaining	  to	  this	  question	  would	  include	  observations	  of	  land	  use,	  hours	  spent	  working,	  other	  occupations	  and	  time	  constraints.	  	  They	  might	  also	  include	  crop	  type,	  CPA	  group	  size,	  and	  access	  to	  extension	  services.	  	  These	  variables	  would	  enable	  a	  more	  detailed	  study	  of	  participation	  that	  might	  pinpoint	  why	  the	  program	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  benefit	  participants.	  	   	   	  
Holstein	  34	  
References	  	  Besley,	  T.,	  &	  Burgess,	  R.	  (2000).	  Land	  reform,	  poverty	  reduction,	  and	  growth:	  Evidence	  from	  india*.	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  115(2),	  389-­‐430.	  	  Bradstock,	  A.	  (2005).	  Changing	  livelihoods	  and	  land	  reform:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  northern	  cape	  province	  of	  south	  africa.	  World	  Development,	  33(11),	  1979-­‐1992.	  	  Deininger,	  K.	  (1999).	  Making	  negotiated	  land	  reform	  work:	  Initial	  experience	  from	  colombia,	  brazil	  and	  south	  africa.	  World	  Development,	  27(4),	  651-­‐672.	  	  Deininger,	  K.,	  Hoogeveen,	  H.,	  &	  Kinsey,	  B.	  H.	  (2004).	  Economic	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  land	  redistribution	  in	  zimbabwe	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  World	  Development,	  32(10),	  1697-­‐1709.	  	  Department	  of	  Land	  Affairs.	  (1997).	  White	  paper	  on	  south	  african	  land	  policy.	  Pretoria:	  Department	  of	  Land	  Affairs.	  Field,	  E.	  (2007).	  Entitled	  to	  work:	  Urban	  property	  rights	  and	  labor	  supply	  in	  peru.	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  122(4),	  1561-­‐1602.	  	  Francesconi,	  G.	  N.,	  &	  Heerink,	  N.	  (2011).	  Ethiopian	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  in	  an	  era	  of	  global	  commodity	  exchange:	  Does	  organisational	  form	  matter?	  Journal	  of	  
African	  Economies,	  20(1),	  153-­‐177.	  	  Godtland,	  E.	  M.,	  Sadoulet,	  E.,	  De	  Janvry,	  A.,	  Murgai,	  R.,	  &	  Ortiz,	  O.	  (2004).	  The	  impact	  of	  farmer	  field	  schools	  on	  knowledge	  and	  productivity:	  A	  study	  of	  potato	  farmers	  in	  the	  peruvian	  andes.	  Economic	  Development	  and	  Cultural	  Change,	  
53(1),	  63-­‐92.	  	  
Holstein	  35	  
Hall,	  R.	  (2010).	  Two	  cycles	  of	  land	  policy	  in	  south	  africa:	  Tracing	  the	  contours	  In	  Ward	  Anseeuw	  ,	  Chris	  Alden	  (Ed.),	  The	  struggle	  over	  land	  in	  africa	  (pp.	  175)	  HSRC	  Press.	  Lahiff,	  E.	  (2007).	  Land	  redistribution	  and	  poverty	  in	  south	  africa	  Programme	  for	  Land	  and	  Agrarian	  Studies,	  University	  of	  the	  Western	  Cape.	  	  Lerman,	  Z.,	  &	  Sedik,	  D.	  (2009).	  Agricultural	  development	  and	  household	  incomes	  in	  central	  asia:	  A	  survey	  of	  tajikistan,	  2003-­‐2008.	  Eurasian	  Geography	  and	  
Economics,	  50(3),	  301-­‐326.	  	  Lerman,	  Z.	  (2008).	  Agricultural	  development	  in	  central	  asia:	  A	  survey	  of	  uzbekistan,	  2007-­‐2008.	  Eurasian	  Geography	  and	  Economics,	  49(4),	  481-­‐505.	  	  McCusker,	  B.	  (2002).	  The	  impact	  of	  membership	  in	  communal	  property	  associations	  on	  livelihoods	  in	  the	  northern	  province,	  south	  africa.	  GeoJournal,	  56(2),	  113-­‐122.	  	  Owens,	  T.,	  Hoddinott,	  J.,	  &	  Kinsey,	  B.	  (2003).	  The	  impact	  of	  agricultural	  extension	  on	  farm	  production	  in	  resettlement	  areas	  of	  zimbabwe.	  Economic	  Development	  and	  
Cultural	  Change,	  51(2),	  337-­‐357.	  	  Statistics	  South	  Africa.	  (2007).	  A	  national	  poverty	  line	  for	  south	  africa[South	  African]	  National	  Treasury.	  	  Valente,	  C.	  (2009).	  The	  food	  (in)security	  impact	  of	  land	  redistribution	  in	  south	  africa:	  Microeconometric	  evidence	  from	  national	  data.	  World	  Development,	  
37(9),	  1540-­‐1553.	  	  Valente,	  C.	  (2011).	  Household	  returns	  to	  land	  transfers	  in	  south	  africa:	  A	  Q-­‐squared	  analysis.	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Studies,	  47(2),	  354-­‐376.	  	   	  
Holstein	  36	  
Appendix I: Regression Results of Land Grant on Household Expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log of Household Expenditure Log Per Capita Household Expenditure 
              
Government Land grant -0.188*** -0.0250 -0.0230 -0.308*** -0.0830*** -0.0841*** 
 





































































































































Appendix I: Regression Results of Land Grant on Household Expenditure (cont) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 

































Num. People in Household 
 
0.0535*** 0.0606*** 
   
  
(0.00163) (0.00155) 









































































































Appendix I: Regression Results of Land Grant on Household Expenditure (cont) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log of Household Expenditure Log Per Capita Household Expenditure 
 




Constant 6.608*** 5.412*** 4.452*** 5.253*** 5.381*** 4.383*** 
 
(0.00338) (0.0243) (0.0304) (0.00390) (0.0264) (0.0334) 
       Observations 106,064 105,819 103,873 106,064 105,819 103,873 
R-squared 0.001 0.334 0.430 0.001 0.417 0.488 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Holstein	  39	  
	  
Appendix II: Probit Results Food Insecurity, Poverty 
  (1)	   (2) (3)	   (4) 
Variables Food	  Insecurity	   Food Insecurity poverty	   Poverty 
  	  	     	  	     
Government Land Grant 0.377***	   0.210*** 0.334***	   0.0630* 
 








































































































































































































Appendix II: Probit Results Food Insecurity, Poverty (cont) 
  (1)	   (2) (3)	   (4) 
Variables Food	  Insecurity	   Food Insecurity poverty	   Poverty 
 















































































Constant -­‐0.421***	   0.442*** 0.455***	   2.158*** 
 
(0.00397)	   (0.0536) (0.00399)	   (0.0747) 
   	    Observations 108,784	   106,360 108,784	   106,360 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix III: Probit Results, Receiving a Land 
Grant 
  (1)	  
Variables Land	  Grant	  













Eastern Cape 0.0590	  
 
(0.0440)	  
Northern Cape 0.313***	  
 
(0.0442)	  







































Appendix III: Probit Results, Receiving a Land 
Grant 
  (1)	  
Variables Land	  Grant	  
 	  
Num. People in Household 0.00331	  
 
(0.00508)	  
Num. Children under age 15 0.00557	  
 
(0.00462)	  
Some Primary Education 0.0473*	  
 
(0.0268)	  
Some Secondary Education 0.0774***	  
 
(0.0286)	  
High School Degree -­‐0.100	  
 
(0.152)	  
Some College -­‐0.118*	  
 
(0.0642)	  
College Degree 0.0755	  
 
(0.0837)	  
Graduate Studies -­‐0.0173	  
 
(0.0808)	  
Farming as: Source of Income 0.579***	  
 
(0.0962)	  
Farming as: Extra Income 0.192*	  
 
(0.102)	  
Farming as: Extra Food -­‐0.159**	  
 
(0.0689)	  
Farming as: Hobby -­‐0.152	  
 
(0.134)	  






 	  Observations 106,360	  
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
